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A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A framework for applying the 
Australian and English approaches 
 
Nicholas A Tiverios1 
 
Abstract: This article provides an analytical restatement of the law of penalties in Australia 
and England. It demonstrates that in applying the penalties doctrine, a three-stage framework 
can be adopted. The first stage is to ask whether the impugned contractual clause attracts the 
operation of the penalties doctrine (this was the issue considered by the High Court of 
Australia in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, 
(2012) 247 CLR 205). If the penalties doctrine is applicable the second stage is to consider 
whether the impugned clause is punitive in character (this was the issue subsequently 
considered by the High Court in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
[2016] HCA 28, (2016) 333 ALR 569). If the impugned clause is punitive the final stage of 
analysis is to consider the consequences that should flow from a finding that a clause is a 
penalty. By providing a restatement of the Australian and English approaches at each stage of 
inquiry, the key convergences and divergences between the two jurisdictions become clear. 
The key divergences exist at the first and third stage of the inquiry. In Australia, unlike 
England, a breach of contract is not required to enliven the penalties doctrine. Rather, it 
suffices under Australian law that A’s contractual right to a fixed remedy exists to secure the 
happening of some other contractual stipulation (being either a contractual duty or, in rare 
circumstances, a non-promissory condition). The second key divergence is the consequence 
of a finding that a clause is a penalty. In Australia, the penalties doctrine provides for a pro 
tanto enforcement of A’s right to a fixed remedy so that it is not punitive in operation. 
English law has staunchly rejected that such an approach is possible. However, there is one 
significant convergence. Both Australia and England have recently adopted a deferential 
‘legitimate interest’ standard at the second stage of inquiry in order to assess whether an 
impugned clause is punitive in character.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Part I of this article,2 I set out two approaches to the penalties doctrine in view of the 
decisions by the highest courts of Australia and the United Kingdom in Andrews,3 Paciocco,4 
Cavendish5 and ParkingEye.6 It was argued that the Australian or ‘equitable’ rule as stated in 
Andrews concerns fixed sum clauses that are characterised as being in the nature of security 
rights. This rule prevents rights or interests taken or retained by A by way of security against 
B from being enjoyed beyond the function or purpose of security, by preventing such rights 
from being exercised in a manner that would impose an unjustifiable detriment or punishment 
on B. This evaluation is made in light of how the law attributes value to the underlying 
secured stipulation or obligation as at the time of entry into the contract.7 Whereas the 
English8 or ‘common law’ rule, as stated in Cavendish, regulates the parties’ ability to 
determine the quantum of a secondary remedial obligation that arises upon breach of a 
primary contractual obligation. The English rule prevents fixed sum clauses which derogate 
too far from a legally imposed remedial regime available for a breach of contract. While there 
is overlap between these two rationales, which is unsurprising given that the rules share a 
common history, they remain distinct. 
 
The purpose of writing a Part II to this article is to bridge the important gap between theory 
and practice. This article looks more closely at directly applicable legal rules in order to 
understand how the Australian ‘equitable’ and English ‘common law’ penalties doctrines 
function. It is demonstrated that in applying the penalties doctrine in both Australia and 
England, the approach adopted in the cases can be broken down into three stages of inquiry.9 
																																																								
2 Part 1 appeared in the previous edition of this journal: insert Journal of Equity citation. [tba]. 
 
3 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 205. 
 
4 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28, (2016) 333 ALR 569. 
 
5 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172. The appeals in 
Cavendish and ParkingEye were heard conjointly and have the same neutral and report citation. Unless 
the context suggests otherwise the decisions will be referred to collectively as Cavendish. 
 
6 ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172. 
 
7 The issue concerning ‘time of assessment’ being a continuing distinction between relief against 
penalties and relief against penalties (see below text at n 127). Hence why Part I of this article referred 
to the relief against penalties as a species of law within the wider genus relating to security rights.  
 
8 Meaning the common law in England and Wales. For convenience, referred to throughout this paper 
as the law of ‘England’. 
 
9 The first two stages of inquiry are crisply set out in Sydney Constructions & Developments Pty Ltd v 
Reynolds Private Wealth Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1104, (2016) 115 ACSR 513 [46] (Barrett AJA). See 
further, in Andrews (n 3) [9], [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Magnin v 
Creevey [2017] NSWSC 375 [11] (Harrison J); and Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd v 
Linfield Developments Pty Ltd; Guan v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 99 [357] (Ward 
JA with whom McColl and Gleeson JJA agreed). In the English context see Vivienne Westwood Ltd v 
Conduit Street Development Ltd [2017] EWHC 350 (Ch) [41] (Timothy Fancourt QC). 
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The first or ‘anterior’10 stage is to ask whether the impugned clause attracts the operation of 
the penalties doctrine. If the penalties doctrine is applicable the second stage of inquiry is to 
consider whether the impugned clause is punitive in character.11 If the impugned clause is 
punitive the final stage of analysis is to consider the consequences that should flow from a 
finding that a clause is a penalty. Importantly, given that the English law and Australian rules 
against penalties have different underlying rationales, it should come as no surprise that 
(despite some key convergences) the application and scope of the two rules illustrates some 
key divergences in the law. Accordingly, in order to identify these points of difference, this 
article seeks to provide a restatement of these legal rules in light of the decisions in Andrews, 
Paciocco, ParkingEye and Cavendish and the subsequent jurisprudence applying and 
interpreting the general principles set out in these landmark cases. 
 
The analysis adopted here is in four parts. Parts one to three set out how the penalties doctrine 
functions in practice. Each part corresponds to one stage of the three-stage inquiry as to 
whether a clause is punitive in nature by contrasting the Australian and English approaches. 
Part four of this article considers to what extent should there be room in the Australian 
context for separate equitable and common law penalty doctrines to coexist. Five key 
conclusions are reached. First, the essential attributes of how the two rules function synthesise 
together to fit the two conceptions for the penalties rule put forward in Part I of this article. 
Second, although the High Court in Andrews expanded the scope of what types of clause can 
be captured by the penalties doctrine, the subsequent jurisprudence has illustrated that this 
approach has conceptual limits. Third, due to a split in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Cavendish, two different approaches as to when the English approach to penalties is engaged 
have emerged in the cases. This is a key point to take away from Cavendish, as the adoption 
of a narrow approach as to when the penalties doctrine is engaged has further reduced the 
scope of the doctrine in England. Fourth, both the Australian rule and English rule have 
adopted functionally similar deferential ‘legitimate interest’ standards in order to assess 
whether an impugned clause is punitive in character. Finally, I argue that the best 
understanding of Australian law is that it ought to be seen as consisting of a unified rule 
against penalties (albeit originating as an equitable rule) and not as consisting of two distinct 
rules (being separate rules at common law and in equity which are mutually independent and 
both potentially applicable on the same set of facts).12 
 
I 
 
ANTERIOR STAGE OF ANALYSIS: DOES THE IMPUGNED CLAUSE ATTRACT THE 
OPERATION OF THE PENALTIES DOCTRINE? 
 
i. Restatement of the Australian Penalties Doctrine: Threshold test — is the fixed 
sum a security right? 
 																																																								
10 Andrews (n 3) [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 
11 This was the issue considered in Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4). 
 
12 Since this article was accepted for publication the opposite view on the issue of fusion was taken in 
the otherwise excellent decision of Ward JA (with whom McColl and Gleeson JJA agreed) in Australia 
Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [359]–[360].  
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Before an impugned contractual clause is assessed to see whether it is punitive in character, 
the penalties doctrine must first be engaged. Post-Andrews, the salient question to determine 
whether the Australian penalties doctrine is engaged is to ask whether or not A’s right to a 
fixed sum remedy is imposed to secure either the performance of, or happening of, another 
‘contractual stipulation’. This other contractual stipulation which the fixed sum secures could, 
and will almost universally, be a contractual duty which B owes to A and which, if B fails to 
perform, would constitute a breach of contract. Thus nothing decided in Andrews upsets the 
well-settled principles that the penalties doctrine attaches to remedial or collateral rights that 
secure the performance of a duty. But the Court in Andrews held that although a contractual 
clause operating in the nature of a security right can, of course, function to secure 
performance of B’s contractual duty to A, as a matter of legal history and logic, there is no 
reason why such a right cannot function to secure the happening or fulfilment of a non-
promissory contractual provision.13 Thus if A’s right operates as a security then the doctrine is 
engaged. If not, the parties are left to the terms of their bargain and the penalties doctrine has 
no work to do.  
 
The question whether A has a collateral right, the purpose of which is to secure performance 
of a related primary stipulation, is a question of construction to be determined at the time of 
entry into the contract.14 This means that the question, whether an impugned contractual 
clause is a penalty, goes beyond the interpretative attribution of linguistic meaning to the 
contractual text. This point was captured in Paciocco, where the question of whether an 
impugned clause was a penalty was ‘a question of construction’, and that ‘construction’ in 
this context refers to ‘something beyond the attribution of legal meaning’ and it encompasses 
the ultimate ‘legal characterisation’ of the rights in question.15 The purpose of this section is 
to provide guidance for ascertaining whether the Australian penalties doctrine is engaged by 
asking how one assesses whether A’s contractual right is collateral (in the sense of a 
security).16 
 
The starting point is naturally to interpret the impugned clause and the contract in question. It 
																																																								
13 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba] p 11. The rejoinder to this approach being that 
any wider application of the penalties doctrine is unwelcome as it detracts impermissibly from the 
parties powers to create consent-based obligations. 
 
14 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FCAFC 50, (2015) 236 FCR 199 
[95], [200] (Allsop CJ); and Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825, (2015) 
329 ALR 1 [471]–[478] (Edelman J); and Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) 
[329]–[331], [336], [371] (Ward JA). 
 
15 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [31] (Kiefel J with whom French CJ agreed), [146] 
(Gageler J). 
 
16 The fact that the High Court is yet to engage in a detailed practical application of the threshold test 
for when the penalties doctrine is engaged has led to academic criticism of the Andrews formulation on 
the basis that: ‘the distinction between collateral and alternative [primary] stipulations is not easy to 
draw’: Katy Barnett and Sirko Harder, Remedies in Australian Private Law (CUP 2014) 306. A similar 
point is also made in Richard Manly, ‘Breach No Longer Necessary: The High Court’s 
Reconsideration of the Penalty Doctrine’ (2013) 41 ABLR 314, 331–36. 
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is trite law that an objective theory of interpretation of written instruments permeates17 the 
general law.18 The expression ‘general law’ here includes both equity19 and the common law. 
At a broad level of generality, the orthodox approach to interpreting constitutions, contracts, 
statutes, trusts and security documents is the same: a search for the objective meaning to be 
attributed to the instrument. So applied to the law of contract, on this objective approach, the 
impugned contractual obligations or stipulations should be interpreted in accordance with 
how a reasonable person in the parties’ position would be taken to have understood the 
relevant contract, read as a whole, in the circumstances20 and context in which that contract 
was entered into (that context including the purpose and object of the transaction).21  
 
However, as outlined in Part I of this article in the previous edition of this journal, the 
rationale underpinning the penalties doctrine no longer turns,22 as it did in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, on an interpretive-based presumption that looks to the parties’ objective 
intentions to wholly determine this question (although it is possible that Australian law may 
ultimately redevelop in this way).23 Rather, the central reason why equity limits the exercise 
of A’s legal right as against B is to prevent B from being subject to an unjustifiable detriment 																																																								
17 This proposition is correct insofar as we are concerned with the interpretation and construction of 
written instruments. However, where fraud is involved, for example in the context of a sham trust, the 
court may arguably engage in a wider inquiry that considers evidence as to a parties’ state of mind.  
 
18 Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26, (2011) 243 CLR 253 [59] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [93]–[118] 
(Heydon and Crennan JJ); Cusack v London Borough of Harrow [2013] UKSC 40, [2013] 1 WLR 
2022 [58]–[59] (Lord Neuberger with whom Lord Sumption and Lord Hughes agreed). 
 
19 Parkin v Thorold (1851) 61 ER 239, 2 Sim NS 1, 6 (Lord Cranworth VC); Tilley v Thomas (1867) 
LR 3 Ch App 61, 67 (Lord Cairns); Solomons v Halloran (1906) 7 SR (NSW) 32, 42–4 (Street J). Such 
an approach is wholly consistent with the High Court’s recent emphasis on there being a uniform law 
of interpretation: Byrnes (n 18) [17] (French CJ); [93]–[118] (Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also ‘The 
Maxims of Equity’  in John McGhee (ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) [5-013]: 
‘The equitable concern with objective intention rather than mere form lies at the root of the equitable 
doctrines governing precatory words, mortgages, penalties and forfeitures’. 
 
20 See Western Export Services v Jireh International Pty Ltd [2011] HCA 45, (2011) 282 ALR 604 [2]–
[5] (Gummow, Heydon and Hayne JJ). There is controversy concerning the extent to which contextual 
surrounding circumstances are available, in the absence of ambiguity, to aide contractual interpretation. 
English courts take a broader view whereas Australian courts have traditionally favoured a more 
restrictive approach. See Stratton Finance Pty Limited v Webb [2014] FCAFC 110, (2014) 314 ALR 
166 [36]–[40] (Allsop CJ, Siopis and Flick JJ). 
 
21 Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52, (2004) 219 CLR 165 [40] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). Byrnes (n 18) [98] (Heydon and Crennan JJ); Electricity 
Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7; (2014) 251 CLR 640 [35] (French CJ, 
Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Mount Bruce Mining Pty Limited v Wright Prospecting Pty Limited 
[2015] HCA 37, (2015) 256 CLR 104 [46]–[47] (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
 
22 The move away from focusing on the party’s intentions can be clearly seen in Webster v Bosanquet 
[1912] AC 394 (PC) 398 (Lord Mersey). 
 
23 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. This approach is still maintained post-Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage and Motor Company Limited [1915] AC 79 (HL) in 
Maurice L Gwyer and William R Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract and of Agency in 
its Relation to Contract (16th ed, OUP 1923) 332, stating that the guidelines that constitute the rule 
against penalties are ‘no more than presumptions as to the intentions of the parties’. For a clear 
overview of the pre-Dunlop position see Pye v British Automobile Syndicate [1906] 1 KB 425, 429 
(Bigham J). 
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in light of how the law values B’s underlying breach of contract or the failure of a contractual 
stipulation. The linguistic meaning of the parties’ rights and obligations is therefore only the 
starting point for analysis. Once the contract has been interpreted, it then needs to be 
construed to ascertain whether the rights and obligations created by the parties fit the set legal 
criteria for whether the penalties doctrine is engaged: that A’s right to a fixed sum, as a matter 
of substance, is characterised as existing to ensure that either B performs a contractual 
obligation or that a non-promissory contractual stipulation is fulfilled.  
 
Indeed, whether the court is construing a contract, penal clause, licence, lease, trust or 
security instrument, the labels used by the parties to describe the legal effect of the impugned 
provisions are simply not determinative.24 Relevantly, as in the context of security rights, just 
because a provision (ie a penalty or security right) is drafted on its face to suggest that the 
right is intended to be enforceable outright (ie without limitation) as opposed to enforceable 
by way of security is not determinative of the proper legal characterisation of that right. As 
the High Court highlighted in Andrews 25  in order to properly characterise whether a 
contractual stipulation operates as a penalty, it is essential to consider the substance of the 
legal effect of the rights created by the impugned clauses rather than merely focus on form.26 
Thus it is open to the contracting parties to attach whatever label they see fit to a fixed sum 
remedy. However, it is up to the court to determine whether or not the label affixed to the 
impugned right is accurate in light of externally imposed legal principles: is the impugned 
right nonetheless properly understood as being a collateral right? Or is the impugned right 
independent and not in the nature of a collateral right? This process involves the court 
construing the relevant agreement as a constituent whole,27 which requires the express legal 
form of the contractual arrangement to be non-determinative and the actual substance of what 
the parties have agreed, including the underlying purpose, logic and coherence of the 
transaction, to inform the inquiry. 
 
While the penalties doctrine enables the court to impose external principles on to the parties’ 
contract in order to reach a legal characterisation that ultimately differs from the linguistic 
meaning of A’s right to a fixed sum, there are conceptual limits to how far the court can 
construe an agreement in order to characterise A’s right as being a security right.  As the High 
Court observed in Andrews, the penalties doctrine is clearly not engaged where A’s right 																																																								
24 See in Dunlop (n 23) 86 (Lord Dunedin); Re Spectrum Plus [2005] UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680 (HL) 
[116]–[117] (Lord Scott). Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [31] (Kiefel J); [146] (Gageler J); 
[243] (Keane J). See too Lionel Smith, ‘Relief Against Forfeiture: A Restatement’ (2001) 60 CLJ 178, 
179; and Sarah Worthington ‘Common Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law’ in 
Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds) The Common Law of Obligations: Divergences and 
Unity (Hart Publishing 2016) 308. 
 
25 See too Re Universal Management [1983] NZLR 462, 470 (Cooke J). 
 
26 Andrews (n 3) [10]–[13] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). For a similar approach 
see M&J Polymers Ltd v Imerys Minerals Ltd (2008) 1 Lloyds Rep 541, [41] (Burton J), discussed in 
Ben McFarlane, ‘Penalties and Forfeiture’ in John McGhee (ed), Snell's Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2015) [13-007]; and Cavendish (n 5) [15] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom 
Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
27 FAI General Insurance Company Limited v Australian Hospital Care Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 38, 
(2001) 204 CLR 641, [33] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
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against B does not secure performance of an obligation or the fulfilment of a stipulation, but 
simply constitutes a fee levied on B when A confers on B some further right or benefit (also 
described as being a fee levied by A on B by virtue of there being an ‘alternative’ primary 
stipulation or a fee for a further ‘accommodation’ or ‘service’).28 This is because where the 
fee in question is levied for the provision of a further contractual right or benefit, that fee 
cannot be seen as merely being a ‘collateral’ right existing only to ensure the performance or 
fulfilment of some other contractual stipulation. Rather, the fee constitutes the fully 
enforceable consideration for that further right or benefit.29  
 
Take, for instance, the following example (based on Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Pty Ld v 
Greenham30 and used by the High Court in Andrews): A and B enter into a contract under 
which B is conferred a right to screen A’s film on a single occasion for the fixed sum of $Y. 
The contract then contains a further stipulation that for each additional occasion that B 
screens the film, B is required to pay A an increased fixed fee of four times that of the 
original fee per screening (Y4). In this example, the fee of Y4 for each additional screening 
constitutes a fee levied by A on B in exchange for a new contractual right or benefit to screen 
the film as B was otherwise not at liberty against A to do so31. Accordingly, the right to the 
increased fee would not engage the penalties doctrine because it does not operate as a security 
right. 
 
In the Paciocco litigation, the fact that the Bank (A) levied various fees against the consumer 
(B) for the conferral of a new right or benefit was precisely why all but one type of impugned 
bank fees were incapable of engaging the operation of the penalties doctrine. Both Gordon J 
at first instance and the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Allsop CJ, Besanko and 
Middleton JJ) characterised all the fees set out in the examples below as fees for the conferral 
of a new right or benefit. None of these fees were subject to the ultimate appeal to the High 
Court of Australia32 and it is submitted that the reasoning of Gordon J and Full Court was 
sound given the underlying rationale for the Australian penalties doctrine. While there were a 
series of separate bank fees challenged in the Paciocco litigation, all of these fees ultimately 
fell into four categories which raised common legal issues. Three of the categories will be 
considered in this part of the article because they all turn on the threshold issue of whether the 
penalties doctrine is engaged. These three types of fee are discussed in detail below but can 
be broadly classified as: (i) honour and dishonour fees; (ii) non-payment fees; and (iii) 
overlimit fees. The fourth and final category of fees were late payment fees on credit card 
accounts, which were the subject of the ultimate appeal to the High Court in Paciocco and 
																																																								
28 Andrews (n 3) [80]–[92] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); and Paciocco Full 
Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [199] (Allsop CJ). 
 
29 See too the discussion in McFarlane (n 26) [13-009]. 
 
30 [1966] 2 NSWR 717.  
 
31 Although, as B was under a duty against A not to show the film unless B had a licence to do so there 
was no discussion in Andrews as to whether the impugned fee could be construed as existing to secure 
this duty not to infringe A’s intellectual property rights over the film in question. 
  
32 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [2] (French CJ).  
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were held to be valid as they were not punitive in nature. Therefore late payment fees on 
credit card accounts will be considered in part two of this article. 
 
Example 1: Honour and dishonour fees.33 Under the terms of a savings account, A charges B 
the fixed sum of $35 to either honour or dishonour a transaction when B attempts to overdraw 
his account. B, a university student and poor saver, has $50 in his account with A. When B is 
out doing grocery shopping at C’s shop the transaction results in B needing to pay C the sum 
of $90. B attempts to use an electronic transfer at the point of sale from his account with A to 
make the $90 payment for the groceries into C’s account. As B does not have sufficient funds 
in his account, A can now elect either to honour or dishonour the transaction and can 
accordingly charge B the fixed sum of $35 for doing so.  The reason why the sum of $35 is 
not a penalty in the Andrews sense is that it cannot be characterised as a security right. The 
savings account operates as a chose in action which B has against A.  That is, B has a right to 
the sum of $50 because at some stage he deposited a sum of money with A and, accordingly, 
A owes him a corresponding debt. However, the mere fact that A owes B a debt does not, 
without more, extend to a right for B to receive a provision of credit from A. So when B 
attempted a transaction which would have resulted in him overdrawing his account by $40, he 
requested a new right or benefit from A. That is, B requested that A loan him the additional 
sum of $40 in order for B to complete his $90 transaction with C. As the fixed sum of $35 is 
charged by A for either (i) considering and rejecting B’s request (in the case where the 
transaction is dishonoured); or (ii) considering B’s request and allowing B to overdraw his 
account (in the case where the transaction is honoured), A’s right to that fixed sum does not 
operate as a right to secure the performance of another right or stipulation, but was properly 
characterised as being a fee, albeit a high fee, for a further accommodation, right or benefit to 
which B was not otherwise entitled.  
 
The fact that A may choose to automate the process by which it decides to accept or reject B’s 
payment request does not change the underlying applicable legal rules. You can ask to borrow 
$50 from me. We can agree in advance that I can charge you a fixed sum of $10 for 
considering any requests that you make of me for a loan. We could further agree that the 
outcome of your request could be based on a coin toss or whether Australia beats England in 
the forthcoming Ashes series. But the imposition of such a decision-making framework to 
ascertain whether or not you receive a small loan cannot transform your payment for a new 
right or benefit into a security right (ie a right that secures the happening of some other pre-
existing primary duty or stipulation).  
 
Example 2: Non-payment fees.34 Under the terms of a savings account, A charges B a fixed 
sum of $35 when B attempts to overdraw her savings account by virtue of a periodical direct 
debit payment. For example, where a football club (C) debits B’s account each month in order 
to extract B’s ongoing membership fees but there are now insufficient funds in B’s account to 
make her required monthly payment to her club. The same conclusion is reached in this 
example as in the case of a dishonour fee. The $35 fee is charged by A as a consequence of B 
issuing an informal payment instruction to A and for A considering whether or not to process 																																																								
33 Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [215]–[231], [240]–[244] (Allsop CJ). 
 
34 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2014] FCA 35, (2014) 309 ALR 249 
[272] (Gordon J), although these observations of the Court were simply obiter dicta. 
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that instruction. If A honours B’s instruction, it would have the effect of either: (i) 
overdrawing B’s account (thereby creating a loan from A to B) or, (ii) if B had a credit 
facility the credit limit would be exceeded (thereby conferring on B the further benefit of a 
right to additional credit).  
 
Example 3: Overlimit fees.35 A has provided B with a credit card account with a credit limit of 
$5000. The terms of the account provide that A can charge B a $35 fee for any transaction 
which will result in B exceeding her credit limit. This fee is conceptually similar to the 
honour fee discussed above. The fee of $35, without more, cannot be characterised as a right 
that exists merely to secure B’s performance of a stipulation or obligation. The better 
characterisation of the fixed sum is that it constitutes a fee levied by A in exchange for B 
receiving a further benefit or accommodation upon B’s informal request for further credit (ie 
a further loan). Those accommodations and benefits being, respectively: (i) A considering the 
informal credit increase request; and (ii) B having her credit limit extended.  
 
There are two important observations to draw from the above examples regarding how the 
Andrews formulation operates in practice. First, in applying the penalties doctrine, courts do 
not attempt to ‘balance’ whether a contract or transaction was, in global terms, substantively 
fair by assessing whether adequate consideration exists to justify the inclusion of a penal 
clause.36 Rather, at this threshold stage of inquiry the court is concerned with whether A’s 
right against B exists to secure either B’s performance of an obligation or the fulfillment of a 
non-promissory stipulation. Second, it appears wholly possible to draft around the post-
Andrews formulation of when the penalties doctrine is engaged. The impugned fees from the 
Paciocco litigation set out above serve as a series of practical examples of what the High 
Court in Andrews termed ‘alternative primary stipulations’. That is, circumstances where A’s 
right to a fixed sum is a fee which constitutes the consideration for a further contractual right 
or benefit. It is not conceptually possible for such fees to attract the operation of the equitable 
penalties doctrine, as they do not operate as security rights.37 Thus it might be possible to 
recast a potential penal provision as constituting a fee levied by A on B to give B some new 
contractual right or benefit. For example, altering the underlying substance of a credit card 
agreement to make a late payment credit card fee levied by A as being the consideration for 
conferring on B a new right to continue using the account, rather than simply being a fee 
levied for late payment.38 By making the fee the price for A’s conferral of a new right or 
benefit on B, the penalties doctrine would be avoided because the impugned fee would not 
operate as a security, but would constitute a legitimate fee for a further contractual right or 
benefit. There is nothing wrong in principle with allowing the parties, if they so wish, to 
choose a second, or indeed a third, fourth etc… primary stipulation. 
 
ii. Restatement of the English Penalties Doctrine: Threshold test — is the fixed 
sum a secondary right? 																																																								
35 Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [232]–[235], [237]–[239] (Allsop CJ). 
 
36 See also Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 71, (2005) 224 CLR 656 [37]–[38] 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).  
 
37 Andrews (n 3) [79]–[82] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
 
38 See Alan Tyree, ‘Fees and Penalties’ (2014) 25 JBFLP 43, 46.  
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The operation of the ‘common law’ or English approach to the rule against penalties is, at 
least at first blush, somewhat more straightforward than the Australian rule. As outlined in 
Part I of this article,39 the English rule is best understood as being rationalised on the basis 
that it is a rule of ‘public policy’ designed to regulate the parties’ ability to determine the 
quantum of a sanction or remedy that arises upon breach of a primary contractual obligation.40 
This rule prevents fixed sum clauses which derogate too far from the remedy available for a 
breach of contract. Accordingly, for the English penalties doctrine to be engaged, the hook on 
which A’s right to a fixed sum as against B must operate is the breach of a contractual 
obligation.41 A breach of contract is required because A’s right to a fixed sum cannot derogate 
too far from the remedial regime imposed by the general law unless that regime is engaged in 
the first place. How then does the court decide whether an impugned clause is a ‘secondary 
right’ which attracts the operation of the penalties doctrine? This is the question which is 
answered in this section. 
 
Two approaches to the identification of secondary rights can be discerned from the various 
strands of reasoning in Cavendish and the subsequent English and Scots cases.42 The first, or 
narrow, approach is to ask whether a clause hinging on B’s breach of contract serves as a 
functional substitute or equivalent to a court order for contractual damages.43 The second, or 
broader, approach is to ask whether the clause hinging on B’s breach of contract provides a 
remedy or a sanction for that breach.44 Asking the narrower question of whether an impugned 
clause performs the same function as a court order for contractual damages considerably 
reduces the scope of the penalties doctrine when contrasted with the question of whether the 
clause provides a sanction or remedy on breach of contract. Put simply, the remedy of 
damages (a money award) for breach of contract is a narrower concept than any sanction or 
remedy for breach of contract that the parties may choose in their contract (e.g. common 																																																								
39 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. 
 
40 This explains the breach of contract requirement to enliven the common law rule: See Robert 
Stevens, ‘Rights Restricting Remedies’ in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds), Divergences 
in Private Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 171–7. 
 
41 See In re B (Children) (Removal from Jurisdiction: Enforcement of Contract Order) [2016] 1 WLR 
2326 [65] (McFarlane LJ), where it was questionably (given the history of the rule) held that the 
penalties doctrine would not apply to a charge over real property that was realisable on breach of a 
court imposed order because the breach of that order would not constitute a breach of contract.  
 
42 To this end, the view that primary and secondary rights distinction is unworkable put forward in 
Carmine Conte, ‘The penalty rule revisited’ (2016) 132 LQR 382, 386, seems to be an overstatement. 
 
43 Cavendish (n 5) [14], [76] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
The cases that seem to map more closely to this approach are Richards v IP Solutions Group Ltd 
[2016] EWHC 1835 (QB) [83]–[85] (May J); Edgeworth Capital (Luxembourg) SARL v Ramblas 
Investments BV [2016] EWCA Civ 412 [7] (Moore-Bick LJ with whom King and Sales LJJ agreed); 
Hayfin Opal Luxco 3 SARL v Windermere VII CMBS plc [2016] EWHC 782 (Ch) [132] (Snowden J); 
and Brown’s Bay Resort Ltd v Pozzoni (Antigua and Barbuda) [2016] UKPC 10 [9] (Lord Hodge). 
 
44 Cavendish (n 5) [280] (Lord Hodge); [291] (Lord Clarke); [292] (Lord Toulson). This approach 
seems to map more closely with the Scots decision of the Court of Session (Inner House, Extra 
Division) in Gray v Braid Group (Holdings) Ltd [2016] CSIH 68 [81]–[82] (Lord Menzies), [106] 
(Lord Brodie); and Vivienne Westwood (n 9) [46]–[49] (Timothy Fancourt QC). 
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contractual provisions providing for the forced transfer of shares or the withholding of a 
portion of a purchase price payment do not function like an award of damages). 
 
The narrow and broad approaches to determine whether an impugned clause is a ‘secondary 
right’ are derived from a split in the reasoning on this point in Cavendish. Although the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the impugned clauses in Cavendish were not penalties, 
the Court split on this important threshold question of whether or not the impugned clauses 
attracted the scrutiny of the penalties doctrine in the first place thus providing no clear 
majority on this issue. The reason why this split in judicial opinion is controversial and 
worthy of detailed comment is that the impugned clauses in Cavendish clearly hinged on B’s 
breach of contract. Further, the narrow and broad approaches appear to be creating some 
potential inconsistencies in the post-Cavendish jurisprudence. For example, there has been a 
potential divergence as to whether bad leaver provisions in a company’s articles of 
association are primary or secondary obligations. 45  In short, such provisions enable a 
company (A) to compulsorily acquire an employee’s (B) shares in A at a rate below either 
market value or subscription value on B’s breach of her employment contract. 
 
Given that the common law penalties doctrine polices the remedy available for breach of 
contract, why then did at least three members of the Court in Cavendish adopt a ‘narrow 
approach’ to the concept of secondary obligations to hold that the penalties doctrine did not 
apply to a clause fixing detrimental financial consequences on B, in favour of A, in 
circumstances where B breached the contract? Before engaging with this question it is worth 
setting out the relevant facts of Cavendish. Although the agreement in Cavendish facilitated a 
fairly complex commercial transaction, the facts can be briefly stated.  
 
The story begins with one company (A)46 wishing to acquire a majority stake in a market-
leading advertising and marketing company (C),47 which was based in the Middle East. After 
extensive negotiations48 where large commercial law firms represented both sides, A arranged 
to purchase a significant number of shares in C from C’s founder (B)49 which would give A a 
majority stake in C. For present purposes it is enough to say that A was required to make 
three types of payment to B for the acquisition.50 The first payment was for the sum of USD 
34m on completion of the agreement. The second payment was for the sum of USD 31.5m 
and was to be paid into escrow and released to B in instalments once a required corporate 																																																								
45 Richards (n 43) [84]–[85] (May J), it was held that these bad leaver provisions where primary 
obligations. In Gray (n 44) [81]–[82] (Lord Menzies); [106] (Lord Brodie), it was held that similar 
provisions were secondary obligations.  
 
46 While the structure is immaterial for present purposes, it is worth noting that by way of a novation to 
the agreement the corporate entity that was purchasing the shares was changed.  
  
47 C was actually the holding company for a group of subsidiary companies that operated in concert.  
 
48 Cavendish (n 5) [47], [66] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
49 On the facts there was also a second seller and each seller was entitled to a proportion of the shares 
in the company but this fact was immaterial to the reasoning see Cavendish (n 5) [48] (Lord Neuberger 
and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
50 Cavendish (n 5) [48] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
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restructuring of C and its subsidiaries took place. A made these two payments once due and 
they were not in issue.51 However, A was also obliged to make two further ‘deferred 
payments’52 at a later date for the share acquisition to B. These deferred payments were to be 
calculated according to a formula53 that took into account C’s actual reported future after-tax 
profits subject to a maximum cap that the sums paid for the shares could not exceed a 
combined total of USD 147.5m.54 However, it was common ground that a large portion of the 
value of C was tied up in goodwill,55 including the ongoing business relationships that C had 
with its clients and senior employees. Accordingly, restrictive covenants were inserted into 
the share sale agreement which provided that B could not engage in certain activities that 
could potentially undermine the value and long term viability of C.56 These restrictions placed 
B under obligations not to compete with C in certain markets and prevented B from 
attempting to solicit clients and senior employees away from C. More specifically, the 
restrictions also placed B under obligations to divest any shareholding in, and not to be 
involved in the operations of, certain competitor companies.57  
  
It turned out that after the initial sale and transfer of shares had taken place, B had breached 
the restrictive covenants. B had, in breach of the share sale agreement, retained an unpaid 
non-executive role on the board of a competitor company pending the appointment of a new 
chief executive officer.58 The central issues in Cavendish turned on the consequences of B 
breaching the restrictive covenants. The contract provided for two consequences. The first 
was that a clause (clause 5.1) provided that if B breached the restrictive covenants then B was 
no longer entitled to any outstanding deferred payments for the sale of his shares to A.59 On 
the facts this would mean that B would lose his right to both of the deferred payments which 
would have been worth up to USD 44m.60 The second consequence was that another clause 
(clause 5.6) provided that if B breached the restrictive covenants A would be given a 
contractual power to purchase all of B’s remaining shares in C at a set price calculated below 
market value.61 The price at which A would be able to purchase the shares under the option 																																																								
51 Cavendish (n 5) [58] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
52 One of the deferred payments was styled an ‘interim payment’ the other a ‘final payment’. 
 
53 Cavendish (n 5) [48] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
54 Cavendish (n 5) [49] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
55 Cavendish (n 5) [66] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
56 Cavendish (n 5) [51]–[52] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
57 Cavendish (n 5) [54] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed).  
 
58 See Cavendish (n 5) [61]–[62] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed). B admitted these breaches of the covenants. Broader allegations were made which B denied 
but the Court was not required to explore this issue any further. 
 
59 Cavendish (n 5) [55] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); [121] 
(Lord Mance).  
 
60 Cavendish (n 5) [67] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
61 Cavendish (n 5) [55] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
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would be below market value because the purchase price was to be calculated on the basis of 
C’s net tangible assets with no component of goodwill to be included in the calculation of the 
price.62 
 
Once A discovered B’s breach of the restrictive covenants the next part of the story was 
predictable. 63  A sought declarations that it was no longer obliged under the share sale 
agreement to make the two further deferred payments to B by operation of clause 5.1.64 In 
addition, A also exercised its call option under clause 5.6 to purchase B’s remaining shares in 
C at the reduced price. In response, B argued that both clause 5.1 and clause 5.6 were 
penalties and that, accordingly, he was not required to transfer to A his remaining shares in C 
and that he was still entitled to the deferred payments for the previous sale of his shares. The 
arguments raised required the Court to consider each part of the three-stage inquiry as to 
whether the penalties doctrine was applicable.  
 
The Supreme Court in Cavendish was unanimous in its broad conclusion that neither clause 
5.1 nor clause 5.6 was a penalty. As noted above, the members of the Court reached this 
conclusion for different reasons. The first split was on the threshold issue of whether the 
impugned clauses attracted the operation of the penalties doctrine.65 The three justices who 
held that clause 5.1 did not attract the operation of the penalties doctrine were Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom, on this issue, Lord Carnwath agreed). Although 
the impugned clause extinguished B’s right to the deferred payments if B breached any of the 
restrictive covenants, their Lordships held that the clause was part of the parties’ ‘primary 
obligations’ and therefore did not attract the operation of the penalties doctrine. The clause 
was characterised as part of the parties’ ‘primary obligations’ as it only effected an 
adjustment of the consideration payable by A to B. This price adjustment was said to reflect 
what A would pay for B’s shares in C if the goodwill in C was put at risk by any breach of a 
restrictive covenant. Put another way, B would only earn the deferred payments if he 
‘behaved himself’ and didn’t risk the value of C’s goodwill by breaching the restrictive 
																																																								
62 Cavendish (n 5) [68] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
63 Cavendish (n 5) [62] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); [118] 
(Lord Mance). For completeness it is worth noting that C (the company) also sued B for breach of 
contract and settled with B for the sum of USD 500,000. As the Court observed it was accepted that 
any loss that A had indirectly suffered to a reduction in the value of C for the breaches in question 
would have been offset by this payment. 
 
64 Cavendish (n 5) [63]–[64] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed).  
 
65 Vivienne Westwood (n 9) [40] (Timothy Fancourt QC): “three of the Justices [in Cavendish] held that 
the clause in question was a price adjustment clause that was in no sense a secondary provision and 
was therefore not a penalty. Another three Justices held that there was a strong argument that the 
penalty jurisdiction was not engaged at all but decided the case on the basis that the specified 
consequences were not exorbitant or unconscionable in all the circumstances. The seventh Justice 
(Lord Mance) only expressed a concluded view on the latter issue, giving his reasons for reaching the 
same conclusion.” 
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covenants.66 Thus the clause was not operating as a functional equivalent to a court order for 
damages.67 As their Lordships observed, clause 5.1 was:68 
 
plainly not a liquidated damages clause. It is not concerned with regulating the measure of 
compensation for breach of the restrictive covenants. It is not a contractual alternative to 
damages at law. Indeed in principle a claim for common law damages remains open in 
addition, if any could be proved. The clause is in reality a price adjustment clause. Although 
the occasion for its operation is a breach of contract, it is in no sense a secondary provision. … 
Clause 5.1 belongs […] among the provisions which determine [A’s] primary obligations, ie 
those which fix the price, the manner in which the price is calculated and the conditions on 
which different parts of the price are payable. Its effect is that [B] earn[s] the consideration for 
[his] shares not only by transferring them to [A], but by observing the restrictive covenants. 
 
Their Lordships reached the same conclusion with respect to the call option in favour of A 
that was enlivened if B breached the restrictive covenants (contained in clause 5.6). 69 They 
preferred to characterise the call option as being part of the primary rights and obligations 
contained in the contract exercisable on a certain event, and that it was immaterial that the 
relevant event that triggered the option was B’s breach of contract.70 The ‘event’ triggering 
the option here being B’s breach of the restrictive covenants designed to protect the goodwill 
in C. Thus the option afforded A a power with which it could swiftly terminate any residual 
commercial interest that B had in C. Their Lordships considered that the fact that B was 
forced to sell his shares in C to A below market value at a price excluding goodwill was 
immaterial.  This was because the reduced price was said to reflect the consideration A would 
be willing to pay for the shares should B’s loyalty come into question.71  
 
With respect to their Lordships, the line of reasoning that the impugned clauses were 
conditional ‘primary rights’ because they did not operate as a substitute to an award of 
common law damages is unsatisfactory. It is artificial to characterise the clauses as simply 
effecting a ‘price adjustment’ for the potential loss of goodwill in C. This is because the 
impugned clauses provided for the same price adjustment irrespective of whether or not any 
goodwill in C was actually lost as a result of B’s breach of contract.72  
 
Accordingly, both clauses appear wholly remedial in nature: they provide A with a specified 
form of relief, and subject B to the corresponding sanction. The form of relief is engaged if B 																																																								
66 Cavendish (n 5) [73] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed), a 
clause that forms part of the consideration to ensure a standard of performance is not a penalty.  
 
67 Cavendish (n 5) [74] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
68 Cavendish (n 5) [74] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
69 Cavendish (n 5) [79]–[83] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed).  
 
70 Cavendish (n 5) [83] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
71 Cavendish (n 5) [81] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
72 See Talal El Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings [2013] EWCA Civ 1539, [2013] 2 CLC 968 
[84] (Christopher Clarke LJ with whom Patten and Tomlinson LJJ agreed).  
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violates A’s contractual rights created under the share sale agreement. Once B commits a 
wrong by breaching the restrictive covenants then the impugned clauses respond to this event 
by: (i) extinguishing A’s obligation to make significant payments to B; and (ii) conferring on 
A a call option which is priced on objectively generous terms. If the penalties doctrine is to be 
understood as applying to ‘secondary rights’ that provide relief or a sanction for a civil 
wrong, in this context the wrong being a breach of contract, then it is unclear why the 
penalties doctrine did not apply to the impugned clauses. Indeed, it is not to the point to 
observe, as their Lordships did, that the impugned clauses do not provide for a function 
similar to compensatory or common law damages. This is because it is circumstances where a 
clause does something fundamentally different from, or repugnant to, the general law’s 
remedial regime which the penalties doctrine is seeking to prevent.73 Put simply, there does 
not appear to be any material difference between the following clauses: (i) clause one — 
which ‘adjusts consideration’ in effect lowering the price paid by A to B by a fixed sum on 
B’s breach of contract which is, apparently, outside of the scope of the penalties doctrine 
when applying the narrow approach to the classification of ‘secondary rights’, and (ii) clause 
two — which requires B to pay A a fixed sum of money on B’s breach of contract which 
appears to be inside the scope of the doctrine.74 Indeed, it is for this reason that the need for 
caution in directly, and uncritically, applying the reasoning of Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption to different factual patterns has already been expressed at first instance.75  
 
Although Lord Hodge saw some force in Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption’s conclusion 
that the impugned clauses in Cavendish were primary obligations, ultimately his Lordship76 
(with whom Lords Toulson and Clarke relevantly agreed)77 decided the case on the basis that 
the penalties doctrine was engaged as the impugned clauses were characterised as providing a 
form of sanction or remedy for breach of contract (although their Lordships ultimately upheld 
the clauses on the second stage of inquiry: as the clauses were not punitive in nature, 
discussed further below). Their Lordships were therefore prepared to adopt a broader 
approach towards whether a clause is a secondary right.78 Given the underlying rationale for 
the English penalties doctrine there is much to be said in favour of this approach. The core 
idea behind a secondary obligation is that it responds to wrongdoing by providing a remedy 
or sanction.79 An award of damages for wrongdoing clearly does not exhaust the full panoply 
of potential secondary rights. Accordingly, it is unfortunate that the narrower test for whether 
an impugned clause is a secondary right posited by Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption 																																																								
73 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. 
 
74 Although note that the Court in Cavendish did provide dicta that the penalties doctrine may apply to 
clauses that do hinge on breach of a contract but are then dressed up as being Cavendish-style price 
adjustments and therefore do not look like contractual damages. Cavendish (n 5) [15], [32] (Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) [243], [258] (Lord Hodge). 
 
75 Vivienne Westwood (n 9) [46], [49] (Timothy Fancourt QC), holding that a clause ‘adjusting rent’ by 
entitling A to back rent and future rent at an increased rate if B breached any material term of the lease 
was a ‘secondary obligation’ and thus attracted the operation of the penalties doctrine. 
 
76 Cavendish (n 5) [270], [280] (Lord Hodge). 
 
77 Cavendish (n 5) [291] (Lord Clarke); [292] (Lord Toulson). 
 
79 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba] p 20. 
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appears to be, at least at the present moment, the favoured approach in the post-Cavendish 
jurisprudence.80 This is a key point of principle to take away from Cavendish. While the 
adoption in Cavendish of a more deferential standard (discussed below) as to whether a clause 
is punitive has, more obviously, reduced the number of clauses that would now be considered 
penal. It cannot be underestimated that the narrow approach as to when the penalties doctrine 
is engaged has limited the scope of the doctrine, thereby reducing the range of impugned 
clauses that attract judicial scrutiny in the first instance. While some may welcome the further 
reduction in scope of the penalties doctrine, it is important that any limitations on the 
application of the doctrine are both coherent and capable of being applied consistently. 
 
Finally, by way of contrast to the decision in Cavendish, in ParkingEye the Supreme Court 
was unanimous in its conclusion that the impugned fee engaged the penalties doctrine. The 
facts of ParkingEye are relatively simple.81 A firm (A) was contracted by the owner of a retail 
park (C) to manage the car park related to C’s premises. During the course of A’s 
management of the car park, A levied a charge of £85 on motorists (B) if B overstayed an 
otherwise free of charge two hour parking limit. The details of the £8582 charge were made 
clearly visible by some 20 signs that were described as ‘large, prominent and legible, so that 
any reasonable user of the car park would be aware of their existence and nature’.83 B left his 
vehicle in the car park for just under three hours and was accordingly issued with a notice 
requiring him to pay to A the sum of £85. B refused to pay the sum in question and so A 
commenced proceedings to claim its £85. B resisted A’s claim on the basis that, inter alia, the 
fee constituted a penalty. It was common ground between the parties that in making use of the 
car park, B entered into a contract with A under which B agreed to leave the car park within 
two hours.84 Failure to do so would constitute a breach of contract, in respect of which B 
agreed to pay the fixed sum of £85 to A. The Court held that the fee ‘plainly engaged’85 the 
penalties doctrine as it could only be regarded as existing as ‘a charge for contravening the 
terms of the contract’.86 Accordingly, as the fee engaged the penalties doctrine, the Court 
considered whether or not it was punitive in nature.  
 
II 
 
SECOND STAGE OF ANALYSIS: IS THE CLAUSE PUNITIVE? 
 																																																								
80 This is perhaps unsurprising given their Lordships wrote the leading judgment and provided a clear 
holding on this issue: see the authorities outlined above (n 43). 
 
81 ParkingEye (n 6) [89]–[92] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); [188] (Lord Mance) . 
 
82 The fee was reduced to the sum of £50 if paid early. 
 
83 ParkingEye (n 6) [90] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
84 ParkingEye (n 6) [94] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
85 ParkingEye (n 6) [99] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); 
[193] (Lord Mance). 
 
86 ParkingEye (n 6) [94] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
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i. Restatement of the Australian Penalties Doctrine: Application of the Legitimate 
Interest Standard in Equity 
 
Once the penalties doctrine is engaged the next stage of the inquiry is to consider whether the 
impugned clause is punitive in character. A contentious issue in the law of penalties that was 
resolved by the High Court of Australia in Paciocco was the status of pre-Andrews 
jurisprudence for determining whether or not a clause was punitive. In Andrews, the Court 
observed that its reformulation for when the penalties doctrine was engaged concerned the 
threshold issue of when a clause was a prima facie penalty. As the Court observed, its 
reformulation of the penalties doctrine concerned the ‘anterior stage of analysis — 
identification of those criteria for when the penalties doctrine is engaged’.87 The resolution of 
the issue as to the proper anterior stage of inquiry raised the question of what is the proper 
posterior analysis once the penalties doctrine is prima facie applicable? The answer to this 
question was provided in Paciocco in the following terms: if A’s right to a fixed sum is 
characterised, at the time of entry into the contract, as existing to facilitate or protect A’s 
legitimate or commercial interests it is wholly enforceable.88 That is to say, the purpose of this 
external norm is to elucidate the extent to which A’s right is legitimate. Thus this standard 
can be satisfied notwithstanding A’s right to the fixed sum not being a genuine pre-estimate 
of loss that A would suffer from a breach of contract, or failure of a contractual stipulation, on 
the application of the guidelines set out by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop. 89  Here a clear 
convergence between English and Australian law can be seen as a similar test for whether or 
not a contractual clause is punitive had been adopted by the Supreme Court in Cavendish. 
 
Returning to the substantive reasoning in the Paciocco litigation, as Allsop CJ (with whom 
Besanko and Middleton JJ agreed) observed in the Full Court of the Federal Court, ‘[t]he 																																																								
87 Andrews (n 3) [15] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
 
88 Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [99]–[103] (Allsop CJ). McFarlane (n 26) [13.013]; 
and Nicholas A Tiverios, ‘Doctrinal approaches to the law of penalties: A post-Andrews intention-
based defence of relief against fixed contractual penalties’ in Simone Degeling, James Edelman and 
James Goudkamp (eds), Contract in Commercial Law (Lawbook 2016) 489. Although, Nettle J in 
Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [322] dissented on the application of these principles: his 
Honour applying the Dunlop principles in Paciocco but remaining open to applying the legitimate 
interest standard in ‘more complex types of cases’. 
 
89 Dunlop (n 23) 86–8 (Lord Dunedin) paraphrased by Nettle J in Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 
4) [317] as follows: “(1) whether the contract describes the payment as a penalty or liquidated damages 
is not decisive; (2) the essence of a penalty is a payment "in terrorem" (which in this context means to 
deter the offending party from committing the breach), whereas the essence of liquidated damages is a 
genuine pre-estimate of damage; (3) the question is one of "construction" (more accurately, of 
characterisation) of the terms of the contract having regard to the inherent circumstances of the contract 
at the time the contract was made; (4)(a) the agreed sum will be held to be a penalty if it is extravagant 
and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to 
have followed from the breach; (4)(b) the agreed sum may be held to be a penalty where the breach 
consists only in not paying a sum of money and the stipulated sum is greater than the sum which ought 
to have been paid; (4)(c) there is a presumption that a single lump sum is a penalty if it is payable on 
the occurrence of one or more of several events of which some may occasion serious damage and 
others do not; and (4)(d) where the consequences of breach make the precise pre-estimate of damage 
almost impossible, it is more probable that an agreed sum is a penalty than where the damage is 
capable of precise estimation”. See Ringrow, above n 36, at [32] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby 
Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
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object of and purpose of the doctrine of penalties is vindicated if one considers whether the 
agreed sum is commensurate with the interest protected by the bargain’.90 His Honour’s 
formulation proved influential in the High Court.91 As Kiefel J (with whom French CJ 
agreed)92 said, the appropriate test was to consider:93 
 
whether a provision for the payment of a sum of money on default is out of all proportion to 
the interests of the party which it is the purpose of the provision to protect. This interest may 
be of a business or financial nature. 
 
Similarly, Keane J too noted that the critical issue in ascertaining whether an impugned fixed 
sum clause was punitive and thus enforceable only by way of security was to consider 
whether the sum was protective of A’s legitimate interests in the performance of the 
bargain.94 Likewise, Gageler J, paraphrasing the decision of Wilson J in O’Dea v Allstates 
Leasing System (WA) Pty Ltd,95 framed the inquiry as whether the impugned stipulation: 96 
 
can be considered to be a ‘genuine pre-estimate of [A’s] ... probable or possible interest in 
[B’s] due performance of the principal obligation … or “whether it is a penalty inserted 
‘merely to secure the enjoyment of a collateral object. 
 
In Paciocco the existence of legitimate interests was the reason why late payment fees on 
credit card accounts were characterised as not existing merely to secure performance of a 
primary obligation and therefore the fees were fully enforceable.97 As a simplified example,98 
a Bank (A) provides a consumer (B) with a credit card account. The terms of the account 																																																								
90 Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [103] (Allsop CJ). See also at [137], [147], [163]–
[165], [176]–[170], [177] (Allsop CJ).   
 
91 The reasoning of Allsop CJ also proved influential in the reasoning of Supreme Court in Cavendish 
(n 5) see text at (n 102). 
 
92 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [2] (French CJ). 
 
93 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [29], [57], [58] (Kiefel J). There has been a renewed interest 
in the aspects of the decision in Dunlop (n 23) 88–89 (Lord Dunedin), 91 (Lord Atkinson); 103 (Lord 
Parmoor), which focused not just on A’s potential loss on failure of the secure stipulation but rather on 
A’s commercial or legitimate interests in the performance of the contract. See also Tiverios (n 88) 465–
7. 
 
94 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [270] (Keane J). 
 
95 [1983] HCA 3, (1983) 152 CLR 359, 383 (Wilson J).  
 
96 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [157] (Gageler J). See at [165], framing the inquiry this way 
allows identification of whether the clause functions beyond having a punitive operation.  
97 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [58], [69] (Kiefel J); [141]–[143], [172]–[177] (Gageler J); 
[271]–[279] (Keane J). See too Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [163]–[165], [176]–
[170], [177] (Allsop CJ), his Honour also referred to the difficulty of assessing damages that would 
result from B’s breach of contract: at [183]. Similar reasoning, focusing on, provisioning costs and 
regulatory capital costs, was adopted in upholding a like clause in Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde 
Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328 [23], [26], [29], [90]–[95] (McDougall J with whom 
Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreed). 
 
98 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [11]–[12] (Kiefel J). 
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oblige B to make minimum monthly repayments to A on a set date. The terms of the account 
further provide that A can charge B the sum of $3599 if she fails to make her obliged 
repayment on time. Here the late payment fee was justifiable on the basis that, properly 
characterised, it served multiple legitimate interests, being: (i) preserving the value of the 
book debts owed to A in global terms by discouraging a default because a borrower in default 
has a greater credit risk than before default;100 (ii) preserving A’s capital as A is required 
under prudential regulations to hold a sum of ‘regulatory capital’, which increases when A’s 
assets become impaired, resulting in such capital becoming unavailable to earn normal 
banking returns; (iii) the operational costs associated with chasing payment from bad debtors 
(e.g. the costs of A hiring staff in order to contact borrowers in B’s position).  
 
As the Australian test at this stage of inquiry is similar to that at English law, the outcome of 
the decisions in Cavendish and ParkingEye will be outlined before commenting on the 
implications of the new test for whether a clause is punitive in operation.  
 
ii. Restatement of the English Penalties Doctrine: Application of the Legitimate 
Interest Standard at Common Law 
 
Post-Cavendish a right to a fixed sum is clearly enforceable despite the clause not being a 
genuine pre-estimate of loss on the application of the classic Dunlop formulation for whether 
a clause is punitive in character.101 As Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption (with whom Lord 
Carnwath agreed) said, the true test for whether the penalties doctrine is engaged requires 
consideration of ‘unconscionability’ and ‘exorbitance’ by reference to the following external 
norm: 102 
 
whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on [B] 
out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of [A] in the enforcement of the primary 
obligation.  
 
The test posited by Lord Hodge (with whom Lord Clarke agreed) was functionally the 
same:103 
 
																																																								
99 Note that A had a contractual power to set the fee from time to time. Accordingly, the fee was in the 
sum of $20 for a portion of the relevant period. Although this fact was not material to the outcome in 
the case: Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [12] (Kiefel J); [82] (Gageler J). 
 
100 See further the similar conclusions reached in the cases discussed by Lord Mance in Cavendish (n 5) 
[146]–[148]. 
 
101 Altough the approach adopted in Cavendish can be seen as an extension of the more deferential test 
that allowed a non-compensatory fixed sum clause to be enforced provided there was a ‘commercial 
justification’ for its imposition: set out by Coleman J in Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia 
[1996] QB 752, 764; and see too Murray v Leisureplay Plc [2005] IRLR 946. 
 
102 Cavendish (n 5) [22], [28], [31]–[32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord 
Carnwath agreed).  
 
103 Cavendish (n 5) [255] (Lord Hodge). 
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the correct test for a penalty is whether the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of 
[B’s] breach of contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to [A’s] interest in 
the performance of the contract.  
 
Similarly, Lord Mance observed that ‘[A’s] commercial interests may justify the imposition 
upon [B’s] breach of contract of a financial burden which cannot either be related directly to 
loss caused by the breach or justified by reference to the impossibility of assessing such 
loss’.104 
 
In Cavendish, both clause 5.1 (concerning A’s ability to withhold payments otherwise due to 
B on B’s breach of a restrictive covenant) and clause 5.6 (concerning A’s power to acquire 
B’s remaining shares in C on B’s breach of a restrictive covenant) were held to be 
commensurate with A’s legitimate interests. The Court unanimously held that clause 5.1 was 
not a penalty as it served a ‘legitimate interest’, as the fee was not out of all proportion to 
achieving the principal purposes of:105 (i) ensuring the maintenance of the value of goodwill 
in C, which was particularly important because a ‘large proportion’ of C’s value was 
attributable to goodwill and because interpersonal relationships were central to the long-term 
viability and competitiveness of any advertising company operating in the markets in which C 
competes; (ii) protecting the value of the shares in C which B had already sold to A; (iii) 
deterring B from engaging in even a minor breach of the restrictive covenants, as even a 
minor breach could have a significant financial impact on the value of A’s shareholding, as 
the Court observed: B’s loyalty was indivisible, once it was lost the prejudice that could be 
caused to the value of the shares in C was considerable.106 Two further interests were 
identified to support the validity of clause 5.6 (the forced transfer of shareholding provisions), 
being:107 (i) the need for the parties quickly to decouple their business relationship once that 
relationship had broken down due to a breach of the restrictive covenants; and (ii) given that 
the English penalties doctrine wholly voids clauses, the Court expressed its concern that 
wholly voiding a contractual power to acquire shares would considerably alter the overall 
structure of the parties’ bargain.  
 
Finally, the Court in Cavendish emphasised that the bargaining position of the parties was a 
relevant contextual factor in deciding whether a fixed remedy clause was commensurate with 
the interests which the clause sought to protect. The Court observed that where the impugned 
clause was agreed upon by sophisticated parties acting on legal advice it would be appropriate 
to afford greater deference to party autonomy. Thus the Court observed that the impugned 
clauses had been agreed by parties that were ‘sophisticated, successful and experienced 																																																								
104 Cavendish (n 5) [145], [152] (Lord Mance). 
 
105 See Cavendish (n 5) [75] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); 
[180]–[181] (Lord Mance); [270]–[279] (Lord Hodge). Although not cited in Cavendish the same 
conclusion was reached, and similar reasoning employed, in the somewhat analogous case of Reynolds 
v Bridge (1856) 6 El & Bl 528, 119 ER 961. Although decided under the interpretive-based approach, 
the sum of £2000 in favour of A to secure B’s performance of restrictive covenants in the sale of a 
medical practice conducted as a partnership between A and B was held to be fully enforceable. 
 
106 Note the court rejected the submissions that this would result in overcompensation.  
 
107 See Cavendish (n 5) [81]–[82] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); [185] (Lord Mance); [281]–[282] (Lord Hodge). 
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commercial people bargaining on equal terms over a long period with expert legal advice’.108 
Although it is hard to know what weight to ascribe to the parties’ bargaining position,109 or 
indeed whether such factors were essential to the reasoning in Cavendish, the bargaining 
position of the parties has nonetheless been widely used as a contextual factor informing the 
application of the legitimate interest standard in the post-Cavendish jurisprudence. 110 
However, it is important not to overstate the importance of the parties’ bargaining position in 
determining the proper characterisation of an impugned clause. It still remains possible for a 
clause to be punitive notwithstanding that two commercial, and well-advised, parties have 
agreed it.111 
 
Consistently with the outcome in Cavendish, the impugned fee in ParkingEye was also held 
to be commensurate with A’s legitimate interests. In ParkingEye, A levied a £85 charge on B 
if B overstayed a free of charge two hour parking limit. It was common ground between the 
parties that in making use of the car park, B entered into a contract with A under which B 
agree to leave the car park within two hours. Failure to do so would constitute a breach of 
contract, in respect of which B agreed to pay the fixed sum of £85 to A. The Court held that 
the fee was not punitive in nature as it had served a ‘legitimate interest’, as the fee was 
characterised as having the principal purposes of: (i) deterring motorists from abusing the car 
park by staying beyond the period of free parking and thus facilitating a turnover of potential 
consumers for the attached retail premises; and (ii) enabling A (the parking services provider) 
to properly administer the free parking scheme (which included a profit motive).112 
 
iii. A brief comment on the legitimate interest standard 
 
At this second stage of the three-stage analysis as to whether an impugned clause is a penalty, 
a convergence between English and Australian law can be seen. Thus there is still some utility 
in engaging in a comparative analysis of cases on this point between the two jurisdictions. 
The clearest way of contrasting the tests set out in Cavendish and Paciocco with the earlier 
test in Dunlop is as follows. The two tests create different external norms under which an 
impugned clause can be assessed to determine whether or not the clause is punitive in 
character. The earlier Dunlop guidelines can be seen as imposing a stricter standard of 
judicial scrutiny: the role of the court is to compare the sum fixed by a clause with the 
consequence which would flow from a hypothetical breach of contract at the time of entry 
into the contract (or a hypothetical failure of a secured stipulation applying Andrews). The 
new Cavendish and Paciocco tests can be seen as overriding this earlier test with a weaker 																																																								
108 Cavendish (n 5) [75] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); 
[152], [181] (Lord Mance); [282] (Lord Hodge).  
 
109 An observation also noted in Andrew Summers, ‘Unresolved issues in the law on penalties’ [2017] 
LMCLQ 95, 115. 
 
110 Richards (n 43) [85] (May J); Gray (n 44) [107]–[108] (Lord Brodie); [124] (Lord Malcolm); First 
Personal Services Limited v Halfords Limited [2016] EWHC 3220 (Ch) [162] (Jeremy Cousins QC); In 
re B (Children) (n 41) [66] (McFarlane LJ). 
 
111 See Vivienne Westwood (n 9) [65] (Timothy Fancourt QC). 
 
112 ParkingEye (n 6) [98]–[99] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); [197]–[198] (Lord Mance); [286] (Lord Hodge). 
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form of judicial scrutiny: the role of the court is to assess whether the sum fixed by the clause 
is out of all proportion with A’s legitimate interests in the enforcement of the related primary 
obligation (and also the fulfilment or performance of a secured stipulation in Australia). Put 
simply, this weaker form of judicial scrutiny imposes a ‘high hurdle’113 on those asserting that 
a clause is a penalty. 
 
The more deferential standard of judicial scrutiny set out in Cavendish and Paciocco is 
justifiable on the basis that the Court should in general be reluctant to limit the parties’ 
powers to set the terms of consensually created rights and obligations.114 Ultimately, this 
deference acknowledges that any injustice that B suffers from the operation of a fixed remedy 
is, in part, a result of those consent-based obligations that would have not come into existence 
in the first place without B’s prior assent. That is, any injustice in this context is an injustice 
that has been voluntarily assumed by B. Further, greater deference to party autonomy 
acknowledges that the enforcement of a fixed remedy clause has an inherent utility for both A 
and B in limiting A’s need to engage in uncertain and expensive arbitration or litigation to 
vindicate her rights. 115  Although this deferential standard will result in fewer clauses 
infringing the penalties doctrine, subsequent jurisprudence has illustrated that the deferential 
standard can still bite. 116 Indeed, a residual benefit in retaining the penalties doctrine, albeit in 
a more limited form, is that maintaining the spectre of a potential legal challenge to a 
purported penalty clause may continue to help facilitate reasonable pre-contractual 
behaviour.117 That is, the continuing existence of the weaker form rule will ensure a base-
level modicum of pre-contractual reasonableness and cooperation in assessing the amount B 
ought to pay to A should the event which gives rise to the fixed remedy materialise. Finally, 
what is the relationship between the Dunlop test and the Cavendish/Paciocco test? Although 																																																								
113 Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [400] (Middleton J). See too Australia Capital 
Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [345] (Ward JA).  
 
114 See Cavendish, (n 5) [33], [35] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); Gray (n 44) [107] (Lord Brodie); Phillips Hong Kong v A-G of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41 
(PC) 59 (Lord Woolf); Arab Bank Australia (n 97) [105] (McDougall J with whom Gleeson JA and 
Sackville AJA agreed). For a powerful moral defence of party autonomy in contract see Jeremy 
Bentham, Defence of Usury, Bk 1 (4th edn, Payne and Foss 1818) [5]. See too the influential, and 
famous, defence of the policy of freedom of contract in Printing and Numerical Registering Company 
v Sampson  (1874-75) LR 19 Eq 462, 465 (Sir George Jessel MR). 
 
115 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [284] (Keane J). Hugh Beale, ‘Damages’ in Hugh Beale 
(ed), Chitty on Contracts: Volume 1 General Principles (31st ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) [26-171]. 
 
116 First Personal Services (n 110) [163] (Jeremy Cousins QC); Hayfin (n 43) [140] (Snowden J); and 
Vivienne Westwood (n 9) [65] (Timothy Fancourt QC). See too the dissenting judgment of Lord 
Menzies in Gray (n 44) [87]. 
 
117 A similar point, albeit in the context of potential challenges to the remuneration of court appointed 
officers, is made in Nicholas A Tiverios, ‘Raiders of the secured asset: The doctrinal rationalisation for 
the liquidator’s lien or charge over a secured asset post-Stewart v Atco’ (2015) 23 ILJ 101, 114. See 
too Elisabeth Peden and J W Carter, ‘A Good Faith Perspective on Liquidated Damages’ in Charles E 
F Rickett (ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing 2008) 152: ‘the rules which make up 
the law of penalties have been formulated to ensure that only honest-estimations are effective to 
liquidate damages’. See also Chris Rossiter, Penalties and Forfeiture: Judicial Review of Contractual 
Penalties and Relief against Forfeiture of Proprietary Interests (Lawbook 1992) 13 ‘where the penalty 
was inserted simply as means of securing performance of the covenant, there being no attempt on the 
part of the parties to assess the real damage. Equity relieved against the penalty’. 
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Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption suggested that the principles set out by Lord Dunedin in 
Dunlop might still be relevant in deciding simple penalties cases or as a fall back position,118 
it is telling that the norm for whether a clause is penal as applied and set out in Cavendish and 
Paciocco has been the universal approach applied in the subsequent jurisprudence in both 
jurisdictions.119 
 
There are two further important observations to take from the reformulation of the test for 
whether or not a clause is punitive in character. The first observation is that both in Australia 
and in England, the question of whether a clause is a penalty is a question of construction to 
be determined wholly at the time of entry into the contract.120 However, a ‘legitimate interest’ 
test engages with broader social and economical considerations than a ‘commercial 
justification’ test or by adopting the Dunlop approach of contrasting the sum in a fixed 
remedy clause to the likely loss flowing from the related breach of contract or failure of a 
contractual stipulation.121 While there is no conceptual difficulty with A’s right existing to 
further broader social and economic considerations, it remains to be seen to what extent there 
are limitations on a party relying on a particular interest to support the validity of a fixed sum 
remedy. Or put another way, how does a court determine what interests are legitimate or 
illegitimate? The High Court in Paciocco took a broad approach to the identification of A’s 
legitimate interests, accepting A’s evidence as to the objectively discernable ‘inherent 
circumstances’ persisting at the time the contract was entered into.122 Looking at the ‘inherent 
circumstances’ at the time of entry into the contract appears somewhat broader than, for 
example, requiring the interests to be within the contemplation of the reasonable person in the 
position of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. It would be difficult to argue 
that all of the legitimate interests relied upon by A in Paciocco were ascertainable to a 
reasonable consumer in B’s position at the time of entry into the contract. Considering that 
the evidentiary and persuasive onus is on B123 to demonstrate that a clause is a penalty, the 
combination of the legitimate interest test and onus will create a significant procedural barrier 
to B successfully arguing that an impugned clause is punitive in character. 																																																								
118 Cavendish (n 5) [31]–[32] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
119 Richards (n 43) [85] (May J); Hayfin, (n 43) [133]–[135] (Snowden J); Browns Bay Resort (n 43) 
[9] (Lord Hodge); Gray (n 44) [84] (Lord Menzies); [108] (Lord Brodie); [123]–[125] (Lord Malcolm); 
First Personal Services (n 110) [161]–[162] (Jeremy Cousins QC); Pencil Hill Ltd v US Citta Di 
Palermo SpA (HC, 19 January 2016) para 24–25 (Bird J). Sydney Constructions (n 9) [45]–[52] 
(Barrett AJA); Wu v Ling [2016] NSWCA 322 [1] (Leeming JA); [21] (Payne JA); [117]–[123] 
(Bergin CJ in Eq); Arab Bank Australia (n 97) [69]–[112] (McDougall J); Vivienne Westwood (n 9) 
[54]–[65] (Timothy Fancourt QC); Magnin (n 9) [10]–[12] (Harrison J); Australia Capital Financial 
Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [311], [336], [339], [358], [371] (Ward JA).  
 
120 The Court did not allow evidence of the post-contract conduct to influence whether or not a clause 
is a penalty when applying the legitimate interest standard.  
 
121 See Cavendish (n 5) [28]–[29] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); [152] (Lord Mance); [249] (Lord Hodge); and Australia Capital Financial Management Pty 
Ltd (n 9) [369] (Ward JA).  
 
122 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [31], [66] (Kiefel J); [148] (Gageler J); [273] (Keane J).  
 
123 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [167] (Gageler J); Magnin (n 119) [10] (Harrison J); and 
Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [357] (Ward JA).  
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A more principled approach may be to require any legitimate interests ultimately relied upon 
by A to be ascertainable by a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time the 
contract was entered into. This approach would make sure that any such interests are indeed 
the ‘legitimate’ reasons why the impugned clause was inserted into the bargain, thus making 
sure that the interests relied upon are indeed legitimate and are not merely ex post facto 
concoctions created by legal advisors in the process of drafting pleadings and submissions. 
Put simply, on this approach, the legitimate interests must be discernable to a reasonable 
person in the parties’ or B’s position at the time of entry into the contract. This would seem to 
fit more closely with the approach in Cavendish where the Court placed an emphasis on the 
factual matrix underpinning the contract and the common ground between the parties,124 and 
even in ParkingEye the Court emphasised the references in the relevant signage at the carpark 
setting out the contractual terms that notified B that a ‘Parking Maximisation Scheme’125 was 
in place. As Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption said:126 
 
the penal character of a clause depends on its purpose, which is ordinarily an inference from 
its effect. … this is a question of construction, to which evidence of the commercial 
background is of course relevant in the ordinary way. 
 
Thus small potential differences between discerning what interests are legitimate may 
illustrate a subtle divergence between the application of the legitimate interest standard in 
Australia and England.  
 
The second observation is that both Cavendish 127  and Paciocco, 128  and subsequent 
jurisprudence129 in both jurisdictions, reinforce the impermissibility of A adducing, or relying 
on, relevant ex post facto evidence to justify the existence of the impugned clause. Any 
legitimate interest on which A seeks to rely must have existed at the time A and B entered 
into the relevant bargain and not: (i) at the time of B’s breach of contract; (ii) when the 
secured stipulation failed (in Australia only); or (iii) at the time when the curial process is 																																																								
124 See Cavendish (n 5) [28] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). 
 
125 ParkingEye (n 6) [91] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed); 
[197] (Lord Mance). Although on this construction based approach it can be queried to what extent in 
ParkingEye could B reasonably be assumed to know about the business structure underpinning the 
carpark.  
 
126 Cavendish (n 5) [28] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath agreed). See 
too at [99] ‘[t]his conclusion is reinforced when one bears in mind that the question whether a 
contractual provision is a penalty turns on the construction of the contract, which cannot normally turn 
on facts not recorded in the contract unless they are known, or could reasonably be known, to both 
parties’; and  [272] (Lord Hodge).  
 
127 Cavendish (n 5) [9], [28], [99] (Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption with whom Lord Carnwath 
agreed); [243] (Lord Hodge).  
 
128 Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [31], [66] (Kiefel J); [146] (Gageler J); [273] (Keane J). 
 
129 Wu (n 119) [120] (Bergin CJ in Eq with whom Leeming and Payne JJA agreed); Gray (n 44) [112] 
(Lord Brodie); [125] (Malcolm); Hayfin (n 43) [137] (Snowden J); Arab Bank Australia (n 97) [81], 
[87] (McDougall J with whom Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreed); and Australia Capital Financial 
Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [329]–[331], [336], [371] (Ward JA).  
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engaged to enforce the clause in question. This approach to discerning legitimate interests 
makes clear conceptual sense on the English approach. This is because on the common law 
approach a penal clause is wholly void. The parties thus ought to know where they stand at 
the point of time that contractual relations have been entered: is the clause void or 
enforceable? It would be an odd result if the changing tides of A’s legitimate interests once a 
contract has been entered had the result of an impugned clause constantly shifting between 
validity and invalidity. For example, if the ‘time of entry’ approach is taken seriously, the 
outcome in Cavendish on the penalties question would not have been different if an external 
event, which was not covered by the restrictive covenants (e.g. a moral scandal effecting B’s 
business standing in the Middle East), had already destroyed most of the goodwill in the 
company after the contract had been entered into but before the relevant breach of the 
restrictive covenant occurred. In such circumstances the interests protected by the impugned 
clauses (being the goodwill), would have been non-existent by the time B breached the 
contract. Yet the agreed contractual remedies hinging on this breach would have still been 
wholly enforceable on a strict application of the test adopted by the Court.  
 
In contrast to the current English approach, several academics have argued that under a more 
‘equitable’ approach to penalties, the court should depart from an inquiry that focuses solely 
on whether a clause is penal at the time of entry into the contract. Rather, it is suggested that 
the court ought to consider circumstances arising after contractual relations have been created 
to determine whether or not a clause is punitive in character, thus facilitating an ex post facto 
inquiry.130 More specifically, on this approach, the focus ought to be on those circumstances 
existing at the time A seeks to enforce her legal right against B in order to determine whether 
the impugned clause is punitive in character given the circumstances of the case. The impetus 
for adopting this approach appears to be a perceived need to further reconcile the modern rule 
against penalties with (i) the related principles concerning relief against forfeiture which 
allow for ex post facto evidence;131 and (ii) the more ancient Chancery authorities that granted 
relief from a penalty because A’s right against B was enlivened by B’s subsequent 
misfortune. Namely, A’s right against B is enlivened because of B’s ex post facto mistake, 
accident or hardship (these cases were discussed in Part I of this article).132 Australian law 
has, thus far, eschewed a return to a ‘time of enforcement’ assessment as to whether a clause 
is punitive.  
 
A ‘time of enforcement’ or ex post facto approach to determining whether a clause is punitive 
was not adopted by the High Court in Paciocco nor has it been accepted in subsequent 
jurisprudence.133 Indeed, ex post facto evidence at this stage of inquiry has been a point of 
																																																								
130 Rossiter (n 117) 153–4; and McFarlane (n 26) [13-002], where it is noted that “there is no obvious 
doctrinal or policy reason for maintaining English law’s clear distinction between penalties and 
forfeiture jurisdictions”. This approach does have a basis in legal history: cross reference Journal of 
Equity Article I at [tba] p 7. 
 
131 As discussed in Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [325] –[331] (Ward JA).  
 
132 Insert cross reference to Part I. [tba] 
 
133 See above, n 129. 
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error for first instance judges.134 Thus Australian law, like that in England, still considers 
whether the clause is punitive in character solely at the time of entry into the contract. 
Although relief against penalties and relief against forfeiture are closely related,135 there 
remains a ‘real distinction’ between the doctrines.136 As Ward JA, echoing Hoffmann LJ,137 
recently observed in Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd:138 
 
 The penalties doctrine requires characterisation of an impugned stipulation by reference to the 
circumstances as at the time of entry into the contract ... but the forfeiture doctrine focuses 
upon the nature of the forfeiture which occurs ex hypothesi after the time of entry into the 
contract. 
 
The continuing characterisation of a penalty at the ‘time of entry’ into the contract is a 
welcome outcome of Paciocco and the subsequent jurisprudence for two brief reasons. The 
first reason, as set out in Part I of this article,139 is that there is no perfectly consistent 
historical theorisation for why the Lord Chancellor gave relief against a penalty. Different 
rationales for the penalties doctrine have existed at different points in time in English and 
Australian legal history. Put simply, legal history does not compel Australian courts to 
maintain a residual jurisdiction to relieve against an otherwise valid clause simply on the 
basis of B’s subsequent misfortune as adjudged at the time A seeks to enforce her legal rights. 
The second reason is that, as noted above, the parties and their legal advisors ought to know 
where A and B stand at the point of time they enter into the contract. The whole point of a 
valid fixed remedy clause is to plan for what ought to happen in the event that the relevant 
secured stipulation fails. Thus the utility of all fixed remedies would be undermined if 
circumstances wholly external and unforeseeable to A, such as B’s subsequent misfortune, 
limited A’s ability to enforce her otherwise justifiable fixed sum clause against B. 
 
III 
 
THIRD STAGE OF ANALYSIS: REMEDIAL CONSEQUENCES 
 
i. Restatement of the Australian Penalties Doctrine: Remedial Consequences of a 
Finding that a Clause is Penal 
 																																																								
134 See for example, in the United Kingdom (albeit a Scots law context), Gray (n 44), the Court split on 
the application of the legitimate interest test, Lord Menzies (dissenting) [84] took into account factors 
after the contract had been entered into. Namely the increased value of certain shares. Whereas Lord 
Brodie [111] and Lord Malcolm [125] expressly rejected this approach to hold that the impugned 
clause was valid. In Australia, see Arab Bank Australia (n 97) [81], [87] (McDougall J with whom 
Gleeson JA and Sackville AJA agreed). 
 
135 Indeed, this is why these two doctrines were described as being species of law in the same genus in 
Part I of this Article. The two doctrines are closely related but remain distinct.  
 
136 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [325]–[331] (Ward JA). 
 
137 Else (1982) Ltd v Parkland Holdings Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 130 (CA) 144 (Hoffmann LJ). 
 
138 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [326] (Ward JA) citations omitted.  
 
139 Insert cross reference to Part I. [tba] 
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As the High Court observed in Andrews, because the penalties doctrine is engaged where A 
has a right against B that secures the occurrence of a primary stipulation or obligation, it is 
axiomatic that in order for A’s exercise of a punitive security right to be restrained, it must be 
possible for B to provide for the satisfaction of the secured stipulation.140 B can achieve this 
in one of two ways. Importantly, both modes of satisfaction are illustrative of B ‘making 
good’ on the original or primary intent of the parties’ bargain: the performance of the 
underlying secured primary stipulation or obligation. The first mode of satisfaction is the 
actual performance, or the closest thing to actual performance, of the primary stipulation or 
obligation (specific relief such as an injunction or decree of specific performance). The 
second, and more common, mode of performance is payment by B to A for the loss or 
prejudice suffered by A as a result of the failure of the primary stipulation (including interest 
and any related costs of recovery thereby returning A to the position she would have been had 
the primary stipulation been performed or fulfilled).  
 
In Andrews the High Court emphasised that a monetary payment by B to A for the failure of 
the primary stipulation will be compensatory: the court will only relieve B from a penalty 
where it is possible to award A compensation for the prejudice suffered by the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of the primary stipulation. In short, because the obligation to pay damages is 
a monetised form of the primary stipulation, A cannot enforce a right intended to function as 
a mere security for performance of the primary stipulation beyond the compensatory amount 
without a contradiction arising. Presumably there would be only limited circumstances in 
which a court could not fix a sum to compensate A for the failure of a primary stipulation, as 
the judicial trend over the past century has been to expand the types of losses that are 
recoverable under the general law.141 Importantly, at this stage of the inquiry it is clear that ex 
post facto evidence from the time of entry into the contract will be relevant for either 
assessing: (i) the monetary value of A’s secured contractual right at the time performance was 
due; or (ii) the loss or prejudice suffered by A for the failure of the primary stipulation or 
obligation.  
 
As a final caveat, it should be noted that a security rights analysis of the penalties doctrine 
should not exclusively depend on the compensatory principle to value the ‘secured’ 
stipulation or obligation. Indeed some care must be made in referring to the expression that 
the availability of compensation in penalties cases is the equity on which the court intervenes. 
This caution is required for two reasons. First, equity and the common law do not always 
value a breach of obligation (including the breach of a contractual obligation) 142  in 
compensatory terms. 143  For example, it would be unlikely that relief would be granted from 																																																								
140 Andrews (n 3) [40]–[44] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). See too Paciocco 
High Court of Australia (n 4) [23] (Kiefel J with whom French CJ agreed). 
 
141 See JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & 
Remedies (5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2015) [18-160].  
 
142 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. 
 
143 A good example being a trustee’s liability to restore a trust fund in specie for a misapplication of 
trust funds rather than require a trustee to compensate the trust for the consequential loss suffered by 
the misapplication: see Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson [No 2] (2014) 48 WAR 1, [339] 
[347]-[348] (Edelman J) contra the position adopted in AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co 
Solicitors [2015] AC 1503, for a discussion of these conflicting cases see Nicholas A Tiverios and C 
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the enforcement of a profit-stripping fixed remedy clause in a company director’s  (B) 
employment contract designed to secure the performance of B’s duties of trust and confidence 
simply on the grounds that compensation for loss was paid by B to A for such a breach.  
Second, care should be taken in giving an overly literal reading to references in old Chancery 
penalties cases to ‘compensation’. Such statements are derived from a period when the law of 
remedies was under-theorised and generally a question of fact to be determined by a jury.144 
 
ii. Restatement of the English Penalties Doctrine; Remedial Consequence of a 
Finding that a Clause is Penal 
 
The remedial consequence of applying the English approach if a clause is found to be a 
penalty is that the clause is void and the parties are left to the remedial regime available at 
general law. It should be noted that this was a clear policy choice made by the Supreme Court 
in Cavendish to further develop English law in this direction.145 That is because the penalties 
doctrine in England historically scaled down the strict operation of penalty clauses at 
common law by applying equitable principles.146 Indeed, Australia is not an outlier in 
allowing for a pro tanto application of a penal clause. Other jurisdictions without dualist legal 
systems or an equitable rule against penalties typically allow for a pro tanto scaling down of 
penal clauses. For example, Scots law147 and many civilian jurisdictions,148 allow for a 
penalty clause to have a scaled down operation. Further, it is arguable that the Australian 
approach of scaling down the operation of a penalty clause interferes less with the parties’ 
powers to create mutually binding rights and obligations. This is because a ‘scaling down’ 
approach at least attempts to give some limited effect to what the parties have actually agreed 
rather than rendering it void.  
 
Finally, there is one emerging trend in the English cases which is worth noting: by expressly 
removing the possibility of giving a penalty clause a pro tanto application courts are reluctant 																																																																																																																																																														
McKay, ‘Orthodoxy lost: The (ir)relevance of causation in quantifying breach of trust claims’ (2016) 
90 ALJ 231. See also James Edelman, ‘In Defence of Exemplary Damages’ James Edelman, ‘In 
Defence of Exemplary Damages’ in Charles E F Rickett (ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 225. 
 
144 Andrew Burrows, ‘Damages and Rights’ in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and 
Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 276. This was because the quantum of a damages award was 
historically an issue for the jury to determine. See further, John H Baker, Oxford History of the Laws of 
England: Volume VI 1483–1558 (OUP, 2003–2012) 41; and William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Law of England (Vol II) (1766) 438: damages are described as ‘given to a man by a jury, as a 
compensation and satisfaction for some injury sustained’. For an express example of judicial concern 
resulting in the imposition of limits on the otherwise unprincipled manner in which a jury may arrive to 
the quantum of damages (albeit in the context of Lord Campbell’s Act) see Blake v Midland Railway 
Co (1852) 18 QB 93, 96–7. 
 
145 In doing so rejecting contrary authority: see, Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026 (CA).   
 
146 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. 
 
147 See Gray (n 44)[89] (Lord Menzies).  
 
148 For example, French law, Swiss law, German law and Dutch law. See, Pencil Hill (n 119) para 9 
(Bird J); Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime 
général et de la preuve des obligations; § 339–341 BGB, Arts 6.91–6.94. 
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to hold that a clause is a penalty.149 English courts have a binary choice: the clause is valid or 
void. Thus there appears to be a noticeable reticence in some cases, particularly in complex 
cases (such as compulsory share sale provisions), to wholly invalidate such a clause, as to do 
so would alter too much the overall structure of the parties’ bargain. On the one hand, this 
may be seen as a positive development. From a functionalist perspective, designing the 
penalties doctrine to present only a binary choice to the curial decision-maker may ensure 
greater judicial restraint in applying the doctrine. Naturally, any judge will want to be certain 
of the proper legal characterisation of a contractual term before wholly invalidating it.  On the 
other hand, a binary choice reduces the ability of the penalties doctrine to respond to many 
species of agreed contractual sanctions and remedies. For example, if a contractual clause 
forcing B to transfer shares to A was held to be invalid on the English approach, the parties 
are left to the general law remedial regime. However, that regime has no remedy that is the 
functional equivalent of a compulsory share sale. Therefore, the risk is that an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach will encourage judges to reason backwards, holding that an otherwise punitive 
clause is valid out of a concern that the general law remedial regime would otherwise be 
inadequate given the circumstances of the case. 
 
 
IV  
 
FUSION: TWO RULES IN AUSTRALIA OR A UNIFIED RULE? 
 
i. Questions and potential conflicts 
 
 
Several important questions remain open in Australia. First, post-Andrews, does a common 
law rule still exist in the Australian law of penalties? If so, do the equitable and common law 
rules coexist or constitute a single unified rule? If a dualist approach remains then a number 
of further questions will arise. For example, does the rejection of the breach requirement in 
Andrews also apply at common law? Is a clause void under the Australian common law 
approach or can it be given a pro tanto application? If a clause is void at common law does 
the equitable rule have any work to do? Could equitable principles which enable relief to be 
tailored in specific circumstances result in different answers being given at common law and 
in equity (e.g. undue delay or unclean hands)? Further, a dualist approach could create 
uncertainty as to whether a lower court or tribunal, with a limited statutory-based equitable 
jurisdiction, has the power to apply a purely equitable rule.150 The initial authorities applying 
Andrews conflict as to whether the decision created a unified151 penalties doctrine with 
equitable origins or whether the decision simply delineated between a restated equitable 
doctrine leaving a separate common law rule intact.152 Paciocco did nothing expressly to 																																																								
149 See above text to n 107. Richards (n 43) [84]–[85] (May J); Edgeworth Capital (n 43) [7] (Moore-
Bick LJ with whom Sales and King LJJ agreed). 
 
150 E.g. Bushby v Dixon Holmes du Pont Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 234; (2010) 78 NSWLR 111, where 
this issues was discussed in the context of estoppel. 
 
151 See Mineralogy (n 14) [470] (Edelman J). 
 
152 See the first instance decision of Gordon J from the remitted Andrews litigation: Paciocco Trial (n 
34) [11]–[17] (Gordon J). See also Paciocco Full Court of the Federal Court (n 14) [19] (Allsop CJ). 
This approach was not expressly disapproved by the High Court. Since this paper was accepted for 
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resolve this conflict. It appears implicit at times that the High Court is suggesting the 
existence of two discrete legal rules.153 At other times the Court’s reasoning appears to set out 
general norms as to whether a clause is punitive without distinguishing between two separate 
rules. 
 
ii. Justifying a unified Australian approach to penalties 
 
It is submitted that a unified rule against penalties constitutes the best understanding of the 
High Court’s decision in Andrews and the present state of the law. I make this claim 
notwithstanding the otherwise excellent decision of Ward JA in Australia Capital Financial 
Management Pty Ltd154 suggesting the opposite. Four premises support the conclusion that 
Australian law ought to be understood of consisting of a single rule against penalties. First, in 
Andrews the High Court staunchly rejected the proposition155 that the penalties doctrine in 
Australia is a conceptually distinct rule of common law and not equity.156 As the Court 
observed:157 
 
The litigation in Dunlop, where in the one court, and in the same proceeding, legal and 
equitable remedies were sought by the plaintiff and the defendant raised the penalty doctrine 
in its defence, illustrates the place of the penalty doctrine in a court where there is a unified 
administration of law and equity but equitable doctrines retain their identity. 
 
As Edelman J later observed in Mineralogy,158 the High Court’s approach signifies a single 
rule against penalties albeit with equitable origins. This understanding of Andrews is 
consistent with the uncontroversial views that while it is possible for legal rules to shed their 
historical labels,159 and while it is also possible for legal principles not wholly to be slaves to 
history,160 in a system of case law governed by precedent history forms a body of knowledge 
or epistemology which can help lawyers account, both descriptively and normatively, for 
																																																																																																																																																														
publication as bifurcated approach was envisioned in Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd 
(n 9) [359]–[360] (Ward JA). 
 
153 See Paciocco High Court of Australia (n 4) [2] (French CJ); [125] (Gageler J); [253] (Keane J). 
 
154 See at (n 9) [359]–[360]. 
 
155 Which had been accepted by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 310; (2008) 257 
ALR 292 [99], [134] (Allsop P with whom Giles and Ipp JJA agreed). 
 
156 Andrews (n 3) [63], [77]–[78] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Although this 
was well considered obiter dicta. The rejoinder to this argument is that elsewhere in Andrews (see at 
[68]) the High Court emphasised that the implementation of the Judicature system was procedural. 
 
157 Andrews (n 3) [77] (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) emphasis added. 
 
158 (n 14) [470]. 
 
159 F W Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (published 1909, rev edn, CUP 1936) 20. 
 
160 A prominent recent Australian example being the decision in PGA v The Queen [2012] HCA 2; 
(2012) 245 CLR 355. 
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what the law is.161 Accordingly, in Andrews, the Court approached the issues before it 
cognisant of the historical development of the penalties doctrine: the doctrine, like all other 
legal rules, has a particular historiography that assists in accounting for its key features. 
Emphasising the doctrine’s equitable origins serves to remind lawyers of that historiography 
but it does not presuppose the need for two legal rules. The key point of engaging in this 
historical approach was the rejection of treating the doctrine as being a blank slate when 
Dunlop was decided in 1915. Indeed, as outlined in Part I of this article, the Court’s 
reformulation of the penalties doctrine in Andrews was not simply based on pre-Judicature 
‘equitable’ decisions made by the Lord Chancellor. Rather, the Court’s reasoning also took 
into account key decisions of the Common Law Courts sitting at Westminster Hall in its 
reformulation of the doctrine.162 
 
The second reason why Andrews is best understood as creating a unified penalty doctrine is 
that the cases decided after Paciocco appeared to be adopting a clear trend toward applying a 
unified approach.163 If these cases, including Paciocco itself, were applying a bifurcated 
approach then it would have been necessary for the courts to consider, once holding that an 
impugned clause was not a penalty, whether that characterisation of the clause would have 
been any different at common law or in equity as the case may be. However, it must be 
conceded that this argument is considerably weaker in light of the recent contrary decision of 
the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Australia Capital 
Financial Management Pty.164 
 
The third reason is that, if Andrews is read as entrenching two distinct rules against penalties, 
then contracts will need to be read and enforced in a complex and bifurcated manner.165 This 
would require switching between equitable and legal spectacles when reading one instrument 
in order to make sense of the parties’ rights and obligations. Writing in Snell’s Equity on 
Andrews, Professor McFarlane has correctly observed that a bifurcated approach of applying 
																																																								
161 See, for example, Lionel Smith, ‘Fusion and Tradition’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman 
(eds) Equity in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co 2005) 38; Stephen Smith, Contract Theory (OUP 2004) 
7–49; Anthony Mason, ‘Fusion’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds) Equity in Commercial 
Law (Lawbook Co, 2005) 12; and Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France ( published 
1790, Everyman’s Library 1964) 92. Burke provides: ‘the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the 
human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the collected reason of ages, 
combining the principles of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns, as a heap of 
old exploded errors…’ emphasis added. 
 
162 For example, Reynolds (n 105) was decided in the Court of King’s Bench. Also, Astley v Weldon 
(1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346; 126 ER 1318; and Kemble v Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234, were 
decided in the Court of Common Pleas. Indeed, the analysis of decisions from the courts of ‘common 
law’ and ‘equity’ are blended in Gwyer and Anson (n 23) 330–332. 
 
163 Sydney Constructions (n 119) [45]–[52] (Barrett AJA); Wu (n 119) [1] (Leeming JA); [21] (Payne 
JA); [117]–[123] (Bergin CJ in Eq); Arab Bank Australia (n 97) [69]–[112] (McDougall J); and 
Magnin (n 119) [10]–[12] (Harrison J). 
 
164 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [359]–[360] (Ward JA). 
 
165 See also Tiverios (n 88) 462. 
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conceptually distinct ‘common law’ and ‘equitable’ penalties doctrines to the same fixed sum 
clause:166 
may seem to make the law unnecessarily complex, and it could instead be argued that there is 
only one penalties doctrine, originating in equity, and that some previous decisions, rather 
than setting out the boundaries of a distinctly common law doctrine, instead adopted an 
unduly narrow view of [the penalty doctrine’s] operation. 
 
Put simply, given the overlap between the two approaches to the penalties doctrine discussed 
in this article, as a matter of efficiency the retention of both rules appears somewhat 
unnecessary. Practitioners and judges should be slow to decry the problems pertaining to 
access to justice and the rising costs of litigation one day and then incrementally, and for no 
clear benefit, proceed to make the law a little more complex the next day. A dualist approach 
to penalties in Australia would simply mean extra work drafting agreements, extra work 
providing legal advice, extra work preparing a case for trial and extra time spent in advocacy, 
writing a judgment, and extra time spent interpreting the content of that judgment. 
 
The final reason why Andrews is best understood as creating a unified rule is based on the 
considerable overlap which the two rules have.167 This is unsurprising given that any common 
law rule is merely the progeny of the equitable rule. Put simply, the High Court’s conception 
of a ‘collateral’ right in Andrews can still capture a clause that hinges on a breach of a 
contractual duty as discussed in Cavendish. Similar tests for whether a clause is punitive in 
character have nonetheless been developed in Australia and England. And while the Supreme 
Court in Cavendish suggested that on a ‘common law’ approach a punitive clause must be 
void and not given a pro tanto operation, as discussed above,168 this was simply a policy 
choice made by the Court.  Indeed, while unfortunately envisaging the existence of a 
bifurcated approach to penalties in Australia, Ward JA in Australia Capital Financial 
Management Pty Ltd, nonetheless correctly concluded that the legal principles directly 
applicable on each approach would ‘not relevantly differ depending upon whether the 
penalties doctrine is engaged at law or in equity’.169 
 
In short, while there are contexts where duality in the law may be welcome, the penalties 
doctrine is not one of them. Anti-fusionists concerns regarding the need to preserve the 
unique equitable characteristics of the doctrine are unfounded. This is because the equitable 
origins of the doctrine were at the forefront of the High Court’s reformulation of the rule in 
Andrews and Paciocco. Indeed, as the recent landmark cases in this area discussed this article 
make clear, it is a truism that the general judge made law continues to develop 
notwithstanding the enactment of the Judicature Acts 1873–5. Given this starting point, it 
would be an oddity if the only forms of legal development that were strictly forbidden were 																																																								
166 McFarlane (n 26) [13-007]. 
 
167 Cross reference Journal of Equity Article I at [tba]. 
 
168 See above text to (n 145). 
 
169 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd (n 9) [362] (Ward JA). And see too at [376] “Thus 
if the impugned stipulation were to have been properly characterised as penal it would be 
‘unenforceable at common law’ [and not void as under the English approach] except (assuming that 
compensation is available) to the extent that equity would permit ‘scaling’”.  
 
 33 
the unification of two legal rules that share a common origin. In these circumstances, and as a 
matter of coherence,170 there is no reason to create a new category of case where any minor or 
subtle difference at common law and in equity could result in different answers being given to 
the same question (whereby such differences could serve to potentially create an incoherent 
and fractured body of penalties case law).171  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Part I of this article, which appeared in the previous edition of this journal,172 set out two 
underlying approaches to the penalties doctrine in view of recent decisions by the highest 
courts of Australia and the United Kingdom. The Australian rule concerns fixed sum clauses 
that are characterised as being in the nature of security rights. This rule prevents rights or 
interests to a fixed sum taken or retained by A by way of security against B from being 
enjoyed beyond the function or purpose of security, by restricting such rights from being 
exercised in a manner that would impose an unjustifiable detriment or punishment on B. This 
evaluation is made in light of how the law attributes value to the underlying secured 
stipulation or obligation at the time of entry into the contract Whereas the English rule 
regulates the parties’ ability to determine the quantum of the secondary obligation that arises 
upon breach of a primary contractual obligation. While there is overlap between these two 
approaches, they remain distinct. From this starting point, this article has bridged the 
important gap between theory and practice, looking more closely at directly applicable legal 
rules in order to understand how the Australian and English penalties doctrines function in 
concrete cases.  
 
It has been demonstrated that in applying the penalties doctrine in both Australia and 
England, a three-stage framework can be applied. The first or ‘anterior’ stage is to ask 
whether the impugned clause attracts the operation of the penalties doctrine. If the penalties 
doctrine is applicable the second stage is to consider whether the impugned clause is punitive. 
If the impugned clause is punitive in character the third stage is to consider the consequences 
that should flow from a finding that a clause is a penalty. By providing an analytical 
restatement of the Australian and English approaches at each stage of inquiry, the key 
convergences and divergences between the two jurisdictions become evident. The key 
divergences exist at the first and third stage of the inquiry. In Australia, unlike England, a 
breach of contract is not required to enliven the penalties doctrine. Rather, it suffices that A’s 
contractual right to a fixed remedy exists to secure the happening of some other contractual 
stipulation. The second key divergence is the consequence of a finding that a clause is a 
penalty. In Australia, equity provides for a pro tanto enforcement of A’s legal right to a fixed 
remedy so that it is not punitive in operation. English law has staunchly rejected that such an 																																																								
170 Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9; (2011) 242 CLR 446; and Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2011] HCA 
9; (2012) 246 CLR 498. 
 
171 Andrew Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity’ (2002) 22 OJLS 1, 5. The 
rejoinder to this argument would be that the differences in the rationales underpinning the equitable 
and common law rules suffice to independently justify, and also to keep, both rules.  
 
172 Part 1 appeared in the previous edition of this journal: insert Journal of Equity citation. [tba]. 
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approach is possible. However, post-Cavendish and Paciocco there has been one significant 
convergence in the law. Both Australia and England have adopted a deferential ‘legitimate 
interest’ standard at the second stage of inquiry: assessing whether an impugned clause is 
punitive in character.  
 
In light of this analytical restatement, three important observations can be drawn from 
Andrews, Paciocco, ParkingEye, Cavendish and the subsequent jurisprudence applying these 
leading authorities. First, although the High Court in Andrews expanded the scope of what 
types of clause can be captured by the Australian penalties doctrine, the subsequent 
jurisprudence has illustrated more clearly that this approach has conceptual limits. Namely, a 
right, as a matter of substance, cannot function as a security where the right constitutes the 
fully enforceable consideration for a further contractual right or benefit. Second, due to a split 
in reasoning in Cavendish, two approaches as to when the English approach to penalties is 
engaged have emerged in the English jurisprudence. This is an essential point to take away 
from Cavendish, as the adoption of a narrow approach for determining when the doctrine is 
engaged has further reduced the range of clauses that are capable of attracting the operation of 
the penalties doctrine in England. Finally, the best understanding of the Australian law of 
penalties is that it ought to be seen as consisting of a unified rule (albeit recognising that the 
rule has equitable origins). This approach means rejecting the idea that the Australian 
penalties doctrine consists of distinct ‘common law’ and ‘equitable’ rules each of which could 
potentially be separately applicable on the same set of facts. 
